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Control of the Export of Technology
HAROLD L. MARQUIS*
INTRODUCTION
It is a clearly established policy of the United States to control
the export of arms and technology of military significance. The
federal government currently implements the policy through three
methods.
First, the export of arms, and technical data relating to arms, is
regulated by the Office of Munitions Control (OMC), a branch of
the Department of State.' The OMC regulates, through a licens-
ing process, 2 various arms and technical data set forth on the
United States Munitions List maintained by the State Depart-
ment.3 The agency exercises broad discretion in the granting or
denial of a license based on national security or foreign policy
grounds.4
Second, the United States Patent and Trademark office regu-
lates patent applications filed on military technology. These pat-
ent applications are made available for inspection by the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense, either of whom
may direct that the applications and the subject technology be
kept secret.5 In the event that such secrecy is imposed, the patent
application may not be filed in a foreign country without authori-
zation from the agency involved.
Lastly, Congress passed the Export Administration Act of 1979
(EAA)6 which regulates the export of goods and technology which
would make a significant contribution to the military capabilities
of potential adversaries to the United States.7 The EAA directs
the Secretary of Commerce to compile a list of data and technol-
ogy that need be subject to export control. This list has become
known as the commodity control list (CCL).8
* Vice-President-Legal, Mead Packaging; Professor of Law, Emory Univer-
sity School of Law, 1965-82; B.A., University of Iowa, 1954; J.D., University of Iowa,
1960; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1963.
1. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976).
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b) (1976).
3. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1983).
4. 22 C.F.R. § 123.05 (1983).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
6. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. 111 1979)
(prior to 1981 amendment).
7. Id. at § 2402(2)(A).
8. Id. at § 2403(b).
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This Article explores the effectiveness of these export controls.
The focus will be on the extent to which they prevent or delay the
acquisition of militarily significant data by the Soviet Union.9
The implications of export controls on foreign policy, such as re-
strictions on exports to countries supporting international terror-
ism, are not considered, although some of the analysis may be
applicable.10
It is the author's position that any attempt to control export of
militarily significant technology will likely fail in its objective. A
significant number of alternative means are available to our ad-
versaries by which this technology can be obtained." Although
preventative measures might give the United States a lead in tech-
nological development, this lead is likely to be short and in some
cases insignificant.' 2
This Article suggests that the threat of conflict between the su-
perpowers is best reduced by achieving parity of military force.
Rather than seeking parity by arms escalation or reduction, poten-
tial adversaries should consider open trade of military technology.
By so doing, the high cost of defense can be brought under
control.
I. LICENSING CONTROLS
The data and technology which appear on the commodity con-
trol list promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce are subject to
licensing controls that differ from those applied to items on the
state department's United States Munitions List. Less stringent
regulations are imposed on the export of CCL data and technol-
ogy. This is due in part to the nature of the Export Administra-
tion Act. The EAA seeks to avoid unnecessary export
restrictions.' 3 For example, export controls are not imposed when
data or technology of comparable quality are available without
restriction from other nations.' 4 The EAA is also cooperative in
9. The controls will be examined in respect to the Soviet Union as it is the most
powerful potential adversary of the United States. From the standpoint of the sur-
vival of the United States, the controls have less significance as to other potential
adversaries, as all of them appear to be much less powerful than the United States
and are likely to remain so for at least the short term.
10. 50 U.S.C. § 2405(i) (Supp. III 1979). The extent to which a powerful poten-
tial adversary is able to obtain militarily significant technology may be crucial to the
survival of the United States and consequently this separate analysis is warranted.
11. A few of these ways are analyzed in this Article.
12. There was virtually no gap between the United States and the Soviet Union
in the development of the hydrogen bomb, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 316
(1976), and the intercontinental ballistic missile, Id. at 324 (1976).
13. Id. at § 2402(2).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(e) (Supp. III 1979).
[Vol. 20
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nature, establishing a policy of exercising controls in conjunction
with the efforts of United States' allies.' 5
The distinction can also be explained by the differences in the
technology. The munitions list is more closely related to military
use while the CCL contains data and technology which have both
military and civilian uses. However, an overlap does exist since
both lists regulate the same technology in an inconsistent
manner.16
A. Commodity Control List
The Export Administration Act empowers the Office of Export
Administration (OEA) of the Department of Commerce to imple-
ment export controls. The OEA has implemented a licensing
scheme' 7 thereby rendering the practice of exporting a privilege
rather than a right.' 8
The type of license needed to export depends on the data or
technology involved. A general license GTDA 19 is required to ex-
port generally available technical data or data which is educa-
tional or scientific in nature, yet unrelated to industrial design or
production.20 This type of general license can be used to export to
any country. A general license GTDR2' is required for the export
of much of the technical data that cannot be exported under a
general license GTDA.22 With this type of general license, data
can be freely shipped to most non-communist countries.23 There
are some types of sensitive data which cannot be sent to commu-
15. Id. § 2404(c)(3).
16. For example, certain types of radar are included on both lists. 15 C.F.R.§ 399.1 (Group 5) (1984); 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (Category XI) (1983). See infra note 54
and accompanying text. See also, Attempts to Safeguard Technology Draw Fire, 212
Scl. 523 (May 1, 1981). "Of course, the lead time gained on a development may
provide a significant head start in making further advances in that technology. If one
country is more technologically advanced than its potential adversary, the cumulative
effect of a lead in several developments could be militarily significant."
17. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(a).
18. The EAA expresses the intent of Congress that "export trade by United
States citizens be given a high priority ... " id. § 2402(10), but this falls short of
recognizing a right to export.
19. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3 (1984).
20. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3b (1984). Educational data refers to instruction in academic
institutions. Data contained in a patent application derived from foreign-origin tech-
nology can also be exported under this type of license.
21. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1984).
22. Id. No technical data may be exported under a General License GTDR to a
country in Group Z. Id. at § 379.4(a). On the other hand, certain technical data (e.g.,
connected with the shipment of a commodity to which the data is related) may be
exported under the General License GRDR to a country in Group Q, W, Y, and
Afghanistan. See infra note 24 for listing of countries within groups.
23. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1984).
1984]
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nist countries24 without a special validated license issued by the
Secretary of Commerce. 25 This data is generally regarded as rep-
resenting a higher technical advance and having greater military
significance than items which may be exported under a general
license.
The procedure for obtaining any type of general license is rela-
tively simple. No application need be filed to obtain a general
license.26 A general license is automatically granted by the regu-
lations,27 subject to the terms and conditions prescribed therein.
The ease by which a general license can be obtained distorts the
government's position that there exists no "right" to export.
Nonetheless, requiring a license to export enables the government
to police exporters by the threat of license suspension or revoca-
tion for violations of the terms and conditions under which the
license was granted. 28
In contrast, a validated license is only issued upon an export
application to the Office of Export Administration.29 This appli-
cation is much more likely to be denied if the export destination is
a controlled country rather than an uncontrolled country.30
In addition to the general license GTDA and GTDR and the
validated license, there exists other varieties of general licenses. 3'
These licenses may not be used if the exporter knows or has rea-
son to believe that the commodity will be reexported by the pur-
24. 15 C.F.R. Pt. 370, Supp. 1 (1984). The Communist countries are classified as
follows: Country Group P - People's Republic of China; Country Group Q - Ruma-
nia; Country Group W - Hungary, Poland; Country Group Y - Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, German Democratic Republic (including East Berlin),
Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Coun-
try Group Z - North Korea, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Cuba. The most severe restric-
tions are placed upon exports to a country in Group Z.
25. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (Supp. III 1979). A validated license is required for cer-
tain types of sensitive data and commodities of special military significance for all
countries except Canada. 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.2(c), 379.4(c), 379.4(d) (1984). In many
cases a validated license is only required for all or some of the controlled countries.
Id. at § 399.1(c). For example, almost all CCL items may not be shipped without a
validated license to a country in Group Z (i.e., North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Cuba). 15 C.F.R. Pt. 370, Supp. 1 (1984). A validated license is required for many
items for shipment to countries in Group Y, which includes the U.S.S.R.
26. Id. at § 371.1.
27. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (Supp. 111 1979).
28. 15 C.F.R. § 388.3 (1984).
29. Id. at § 372.1.
30. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2 (1984). The OEA is required to review applications to ex-
port to a controlled country on a case-by-case basis. The review considers the mili-
tary significance of the data and whether the goods or data are for civilian use only in
ruling upon the application.
31. Id at § 371.1-122. Most exports of commodities for use or resale in a country
are covered by a General License G-DEST. Id at § 371.3. A special general license
is provided for in transit shipments through the United States (general license GIT),
Id. at § 371.4 and personal baggage (general license baggage), Id at § 371.6.
[Vol. 20
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chaser without authorization by the OEA or Export
Administration Regulations.32 Similarly, export even to uncon-
trolled countries need often be preceded by receipt of written as-
surance by the importer that neither the data nor the direct
product thereof is intended to be shipped to any controlled coun-
try to which the data could not be directly shipped.33
As with general licenses, reexports are generally prohibited ex-
cept to countries to which the item could have been directly
shipped with the appropriate license. 34 Export of foreign made
goods which are direct products of militarily significant data is
restricted to uncontrolled countries.35
In addition to licensing control, the EAA provides for periodic
review of items on the CCL. The purpose of the review is to add
new items and eliminate others as warranted by technological ad-
vancements and availability. The review is designed to preserve
or create an advantage for the United States regarding new tech-
nology of military significance. Implicit in the review is the reali-
zation that no country can long remain the exclusive possessor of
new technology.
B. United States Munitions List
Governmental control over the manufacture or export of arti-
cles on the munitions list36 is more pervasive than the control over
items on the CCL. In the first place, anyone engaged in the man-
ufacture or export of articles on the munitions list must register
with the Office of Munitions Control.37 Equipment on the muni-
tions list may not be exported without a license issued by the Of-
fice of Munitions ControP 8 upon an application. 39 A license is
required regardless of the destination to which the equipment is to
be exported. Advance approval of the Office of Munitions Con-
trol is even required for any detailed proposal or presentation to
32. Id. at § 371.(c)(5).
33. Id. at § 379.4. In addition, no General License GRDR is granted if the ex-
porter knows or has reason to believe that the direct product or the data is intended to
be exported to any such controlled country. Included on the list of data requiring a
written assurance is data which relates to aerial and satellite cameras (ie., spy cam-
eras), navigational systems with application to submarines and graphite compositions
which are useful in advanced aircraft construction. A written assurance is also re-
quired for certain items on the CCL that can be shipped to uncontrolled countries
under a General License GTDR. Id at § 379.4(0(2).
34. Id. at §§ 374.2, 379.8(b).
35. Id at § 379.8(a). For examples of such data, see supra note 33.
36. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1983).
37. Id. at § 122.01.
38. Id. at § 123.01. There are exemptions from the license requirements for arms
of little military significance (e.g., obsolete small arms). Id at § 123.30-37.
39. Id. at § 123.50.
1984]
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sell combat equipment in an amount for $7,000,000 or more on
the munitions list for use by an foreign armed forces.40 This con-
trol is necessary because of the likelihood that some technical data
will be disclosed in any proposal or presentation made.41
Licenses for the manufacture abroad of arms on the munitions
list, or for furnishing abroad technical assistance concerning such
arms is subject to the advance approval of the Office of Munitions
Control.42 As is the case of a combat equipment proposal or pres-
entation, advance approval for a proposal or presentation for a
manufacturing license or technical assistance license is required.43
A license is also needed for the export of both data or equip-
ment which has been assigned a security classification,4 as well as
unclassified technical data relating to arms on the munitions list
or which advances the state-of-the-art in an area of significant
military application.45 Export of data is defined broadly to in-
clude not only direct exports, but also disclosure in the United
States to foreign nationals or through visits abroad by United
States citizens.46
The regulations envision a blanket prohibition of the export
and reexport of data and items on the munitions list to communist
countries. It is the strongly stated policy of the Department of
State not to grant licenses to export data and items on the muni-
tions list to communist countries.47 Diversion or reexport of
equipment or data from the country for which a license is ap-
proved is generally prohibited.48
II. WEAKNESSES IN THE CONTROL SYSTEM
If there is a gap between the United States and the Soviet
Union in any area of military technology, it is the author's conten-
tion that the gap is likely to be short-lived because of the large
number of ways the lagging country can obtain the technology.
This contention is probably only applicable where the lagging
country has a strong technological infrastructure and ample re-
sources to utilize one of these ways and to exploit the technology
40. Id at § 123.16.
41. Id at § 123.16(b). Advance approval is only required for a proposal or pres-
entation which communicates information in sufficient detail to permit the intended
purchaser to purchase the equipment. A proposal which describes performance, price
and probable availability for delivery of the equipment requires prior approval.
42. Id at § 124.01.
43. Id at § 124.06.
44. Id at §§ 125.02, 125.05.
45. Id at §§ 125.01, 125.04.
46. Id at § 125.03.
47. Id at § 126.01.
48. Id at §§ 123.10, 124.10.
[Vol. 20
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once obtained. In other words, export controls are likely to be
much more effective against weaker potential adversaries than
against a country with a comparable technology base and re-
sources. The controls are also likely to be less effective when a
country makes a determined effort to obtain the technology, as
has been reported to be the case with the Soviet Union.49 The
difficulty of maintaining the secrecy of technology is illustrated
with the case of Japan which has a "system" of seeking out foreign
innovations.50 The Japanese entertain the idea that anything de-
veloped in the United States will be in Japan six months later.5'
The recent indictment of several employees of Hitachi for alleg-
edly attempting to steal IBM secrets illustrates the magnitude of
the problem. While the United States government may not seek
to prevent this transfer as to nonmilitary technology, United
States firms have apparently not been too successful in protecting
their technological developments.
A country's effort to obtain technology is often facilitated by
weaknesses in the export controls employed by other countries. In
the United States, for example, the license review procedures in-
evitably leak some critical military technology or data. This may
be especially true of the EAA, which imposes a hasty deadline of
ninety days for a decision whether to grant or deny a license. 2
The time limit is designed to minimize damage to the export of
technology, but there exists the risk of improper, hastily made de-
cisions. Another weakness is the occasional difficulty in recogniz-
ing the military significance of technology which lends itself to
civilian use.53
Another defect in export controls is the existence of two sepa-
rate lists administered by two different agencies. The result is that
a certain degree of overlap exists between the lists, causing the
application of differing policies to the same technology. 54 The ul-
timate objective of restricting export of military technology to the
communist bloc nations would be better served by a single agency
having sole jurisdiction.
49. Attempts to Safeguard Technology Draw Fire, 212 Sci. 523, 524 (May 1, 1981).
50. D. SPENCER, TECHNOLOGY GAP IN PERSPECTIVE 31 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as D. SPENCER].
51. Id. at 34.
52. 50 U.S.C. § 2409(e)-(f) (Supp. III 1979). The Secretary of Defense has the
authority to establish categories of transactions which must be submitted to him for
review. The Secretary of Defense makes a recommendation to the President, who is
limited to a period of thirty days from the date of such recommendation in which to
disapprove it. Id at § 2409(g).
53. It should be recognized that the granting of a license does not automatically
mean that the technology will fall into Soviet hands, but it does provide another
source at which their penetration effort can be directed.
54. See supra note 16.
1984]
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Because of the weaknesses in our own export controls, the So-
viet Union has enjoyed some success in obtaining American mili-
tary technology.5 5 The Soviets employ conventional espionage
techniques as well as orbital satellites and other sophisticated elec-
tronic surveillance to circumvent the United States' efforts to con-
ceal valuable information. The costs of obtaining technology by
these methods are probably less than the costs of independent
development.
A. Classifying Critical Technology
A potential adversary might possibly obtain new technology of
military significance without any dramatic spying effort due to a
failure to place the technology or goods on the munitions list or
CCL or in granting an export license when it should not have
been granted. Neither the munitions list nor the CCL seems to
incorporate the important principle of technology control, that it
is more important to control a revolutionary development than an
evolutionary development. It is easier to control the revolutionary
development because the number of practitioners is usually
small.56
It is probably accurate to assume that the possibility of a breach
of security is directly related to the number of people with knowl-
edge of the technology. It is more important to control a revolu-
tionary development because it is more likely to convey a greater
lead time, as such developments are difficult to make. If the
United States has made an evolutionary development as shown in
Figure 1 by advancing from A to B, little lead time is lost in trans-
ferring the technology. However, a significant lead time may be
lost in transferring a revolutionary development permitting the
transferee to quickly advance from B to C. Consequently, the
central focus, if not the entire concern, of export controls should
be on revolutionary developments. The length and diversity of
the munitions list and CCL indicates that this is not the case.
55. How Russia Steals U.S. Defense Secrets, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT 39
(May 25, 1981); How Russia Snares High-Technology Secrets, Bus. WK. 128 (April 27,
1981). U.S. Tries to Cut Trade In Items That Russians Might Usefor Military, Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1982, at 1.
56. A revolutionary development is one that represents a technological break-
through as compared to an evolutionary development which represents the advance-
ment of a more gradually developing line of technology.
57. Export Licensing of (Advanced Technology: A Review. Hearings Before Sub-
comm. on Int'l Trade and Commerce of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1976) (statement of J. Fred Bucy) [hereinafter cited as 1976
Hearings].
[Vol. 20
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FIGURE 157
TECHNOLOGY
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Some of the revolutionary advances are made by researchers in
universities, who often resist the imposition of government control
because they believe it stifles research. 8 The Department of State
controls the export of technology on the munitions list by requir-
ing a license for technology "disclosed through visits abroad by
American citizens (including participation in briefings and sym-
posia), and disclosed to foreign nationals in the United States (in-
cluding plant visits and participation in briefings and
symposia). ' 59 These controls over high technology have been at-
tacked by some universities on grounds of vagueness.60 Ironically,
the controls on high technology are probably the most necessary
to preserve a technological lead time.
The Export Administration Act focuses on the critical technolo-
gies by indexing.61 The Office of Export Administration may
"prescribe annual increases in the performance levels of goods or
technology. '62 Any goods or technology which do not meet the
performance levels are to be removed from the CCL unless an-
other agency objects. While indexing does tend to direct the focus
of controls towards the more critical technologies, it is primarily
designed to facilitate trade. The export regulations do not men-
tion indexing, but do state that it is the policy of the OEA to con-
tinuously review the CCL.63 Perhaps the indexing is done
informally in such review. It probably would not be helpful to
58. Attempts to Safeguard Technology Draw Fire, 212 Scl. 523 (May 1, 1981).
59. 22 C.F.R. § 125.03 (1983).
60. Attempts to Safeguard Technology Draw Fire, 212 ScI. 523 (May 1, 1981).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 2404(g) (Supp. III 1979).
62. Id.
63. 15 C.F.R. § 370.1(b) (1984).
1984]
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quantify the performance levels for most technologies that would
justify removal from the CCL. The removal decision is likely to
be a subjective decision based upon consideration of a number of
factors.
There are certain types of advanced equipment that are the key-
stone for the manufacture of certain products. For example, tita-
nium forging equipment is the keystone to jet engine
manufacture.64 Without this equipment the manufacture of high
performance jet engines is impossible. Consequently, it is far
more important to control the export of keystone equipment and
technical advances concerning it than other types of equipment.
Keystone equipment is listed on the CCL without any special de-
lineation. Presumably, the OEA discriminates between keystone
equipment and other types of equipment in the licensing process,
but the chances of inadvertently licensing the export of a piece of
keystone equipment or technology is increased by having too
many items on the CCL.
A problem inherent to the classification of controlled technol-
ogy is the determination as to which technology would be of mili-
tary significance to our adversaries. One can envision how a
technology of little military value to the United States could un-
forseeably be significantly more valuable to an adversary. Con-
versely, much of the concern over the export of large computers to
the Soviet Union is considered by some commentators to be un-
founded.65 Once resolved, the task becomes on which of the ex-
port control lists the technology should be placed. Technology
must be "militarily critical" to be placed on the CCL,66 but it is
only necessary that an item be armament technology to be placed
on the munitions list.67
It would seem to be an inherent characteristic of the munitions
list that all of the technology and goods would be militarily criti-
cal. However, that is not the case as the munitions list contains
many conventional arms because exports are controlled for both
national security and foreign policy reasons.68
The failure to include militarily significant goods or technology
on the munitions list or the CCL does not mean that the Soviet
Union has access unless it is directly exported to them. However,
the transfer of the goods or technology to another country in-
creases their chances of access to some degree.
64. 1976 Hearings, supra note 57.
65. H. R. NAU, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 24 (1976).
66. 50 U.S.C. § 2404(d) (Supp. III 1979).
67. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1983).
68. For example, nonautomatic firearms and bayonets are included on the muni-
tions list. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1983).
[Vol. 20
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One of the most serious weaknesses in the export control system
appears to be in failing to adequately indentify and focus atten-
tion on revolutionary advances, keystone equipment and technol-
ogy which are in fact militarily critical. This failure results in the
control effect becoming dissipated.
B. Information Available in the United States
Presumably any potential adversary would have access to data
that was generally available to the public in this country. The fact
that data is publicly available does not mean that it can be ob-
tained cost-free. Because of the plethora of sources and quantity
of public data, the search and analysis costs might be significant.
A thorough search would include an analysis of scientific and ed-
ucational data which does not have any direct military applica-
tion, as it might provide a base for the development of a military
application.
Despite the secrecy surrounding scientific development of new
technology in the United States, the Soviet Union enjoys free ac-
cess to a multitude of technological literature. This is especially
true of literature concerning technology having both civilian and
military capabilities. This information may enable the Soviet
Union to surmise the direction of American technological devel-
opment. For example, the publicity surrounding the development
of the stealth bomber by the United States, 69 and the role of
graphite compositions in that development, likely encouraged the
Soviets to develop similar aircraft.
As in the case of dissemination of scientific knowledge, the
training of foreign students in universities in the United States fa-
cilitates the dissemination of technology. A hint about technical
development can often be obtained at trade shows in the West,
which the Soviets regularly attend. The hiring of personnel
skilled in the technology is sometimes successful.70
It appears to be a major weakness of the export controls that
they do not bar disclosure of technology on the CCL within the
United States except with knowledge or intent that the data will
be exported.7' The EAA does not otherwise impose any secrecy
obligation upon firms or individuals that possess technical data on
the CCL. The underlying assumption of the EAA must be that it
69. No Stealth or Shame, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1980, at 32, col. 1.
70. 1976 Hearings, supra note 57, at 122 (statement of Thomas A. Christiansen).
71. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b) (1984). Export of technical data is defined as the export
out of the United States or "any release of technical data in the United States with
knowledge or intent that" it will be exported. A general or validated license is needed
to export technical data.
1984]
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would not be in the best interest for a firm to publicly disclose the
valuable proprietary information. While control over internal dis-
semination would increase the effectiveness of the system, it
would do so at a cost to domestic commerce and technical
progress.
While the controls over items on the munitions list are more
pervasive than the controls over the CCL, there are also some ap-
parent gaps in the controls over the former. Unless data or equip-
ment on the munitions list has a security classification, there is no
ban against public or private disclosure in the United States unless
it could be asserted that this constituted an "export." 72 Private
disclosure to the wrong party could result in an unauthorized ex-
port. Self-interest of the owners of proprietary information un-
doubtedly minimizes such disclosures.
Export control could be facilitated through the registration of
arms manufacturers. 73 The licensing of manufacturers would per-
haps reduce the risk of untrustworthy persons exporting sensitive
data and equipment. Currently, registration of the manufacturers
of items on the CCL is not required. This again exemplifies the
inconsistencies between controls exercised over the CCL and the
munitions list which is not justifiable on the mere ground of en-
couraging trade of civilian trade.
Another readily apparent gap in export controls is the failure to
control internal disclosure. This gap is partly closed by the fact
that some of the more militarily critical information was devel-
oped for the military and bears a security classification. Greater
control over internal dissemination was not granted because it is
incompatible with our open society and the need for scientific
data to be freely disseminated to aid in scientific progress.
C Information Available Abroad
In spite of the prohibition on reexport of technical data and the
export of goods made from such data to any controlled country, it
is difficult for the United States to control activities abroad.
While these bans purport to apply to any "person in a foreign
country," 74 many of these people are beyond the jurisdiction of
federal courts. Future shipments to a straying importer can be
prohibited, 75 but the threat of this sanction may be insufficient to
72. 22 C.F.R. § 125.03 (1983). Perhaps under certain circumstances it could be
argued that public disclosure inevitably involved disclosure to foreign nationals and,
hence, constituted an export. However, this argument seems tenuous.
73. Id. at § 122.01.
74. 15 C.F.R. §§ 374.1, 379.8 (1984).
75. Id. at § 387.1(b).
[Vol. 20
13
Marquis and Kundin: Control of the Export of Technology
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY
deter violations even though violations of the EAA or other regu-
lations are subject to severe criminal sanctions.76 In addition to
the inability of the United States to control activities abroad, the
presence of the goods or technology abroad provides another tar-
get for the intelligence gathering operation of a potential
adversary.
As the export control mechanism is based largely upon restrict-
ing exports to controlled countries, the President can add or drop
a country from the controlled group at any time.77 However, if
critical data or goods have been shipped to a friendly country
which later becomes allied with a country in the controlled group,
the effectiveness of the export controls is diminished. The recent
revolution in Iran serves as a vivid example of how quickly a
country can become unfriendly to the United States and exposes
the vulnerability of export controls that permit shipments to "un-
stable" countries.
The EAA dictates that export controls not be imposed upon
goods or technology which "are available without restriction from
sources outside the United States in significant quantities and
comparable in quality to those produced in the United States. 7
Congress recognized that imposing controls when the goods or
technology were available abroad was not only a futile gesture but
adversely affected the balance of payments and domestic employ-
ment.79 The OEA is required to review on a continuing basis the
availability of goods and technology from sources outside of the
United States.80
In order to maintain some degree of uniformity in export con-
trols between the United States and its allies, an informal organi-
zation called COCOM has been formed.81 Members of COCOM
consist of the United States, Japan, and all members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, except for Iceland. COCOM is es-
sentially a type of cartel which uses the boycott tactic to keep mili-
tarily critical technology from the Soviet Union and its allies. A
boycott will obviously not be successful unless all of the countries
which possess the technology join the cartel. Two important in-
dustrial nations, Sweden and Switzerland, are not members of
COCOM. Consequently, the Soviet Union can sometimes obtain
76. 50 U.S.C. 2410 (Supp. III 1979).
77. 50 U.S.C. § 2404(b) (Supp. III 1979).
78. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(c) (Supp. 111 1979).
79. Id at § 2401(2).
80. Id. at § 2404(f).
81. 1976 Hearings, supra note 57, at 8 (statement of J. Kenneth Fasick). The
EAA requires the United States to enter into negotiations for multilateral export con-
trols. 50 U.S.C. 2404(i) (Supp. III 1979).
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the technology from a non-COCOM country. 2 Since most of
western technology originates in COCOM countries, the Soviet
Union will sometimes be unsuccessful. If the technology is avail-
able in a single non-COCOM country, the Soviet Union may have
to pay a monopoly price for the technology. If this should occur,
the boycott would be partially successful because the high price
would mean that the Soviet Union would have to forego some
other purchase.
The main obstacle to the success of the boycott is "in the incen-
tive to cheat that is dangled before the members. '3 3 Honesty is a
foolish policy for each member of COCOM if the other countries
cannot be counted upon to comply with the boycott.84 A single
member of COCOM may be able to sell goods or technology to
the Soviet Union at a monopoly price if the goods or technology
are not available elsewhere. While the sale would not directly
help the cheating country if it were made by a private company,
the money would aid the domestic economy. The fear that other
members of COCOM are cheating may lead an otherwise honest
member to cheat. On the other hand, national security and for-
eign policy considerations may tend to curb the cheating ten-
dency. One would think that extensive cheating would be
detected but sporadic cheating may not be. A country may be
able to use the excuse of inadvertence for some cheating.
The implication of applying the cartel theory to this situation is
that the less temptation that COCOM places in the way of its
members, the greater cooperation that is likely to occur. Conse-
quently, only technology and goods that are militarily critical
should be subject to control. Perhaps control should be limited to
the revolutionary developments. This should result in greater co-
operation being obtained in recognition of the mutual necessity.
Also, cheating may be easier to detect because independent devel-
opment in the Soviet Union can often be discounted. Cheating
would also be easier to detect when dealing with revolutionary
technology as fewer members of COCOM would probably have
access to it. The author was unable to find many verified inci-
dents of cheating, but success is not likely to be publicized by the
cheating party. Members of COCOM are likely to maintain an
outward appearance of cooperation.
With the growing technological base of many foreign countries,
82. 1976 Hearings, supra note 57, at 19 (statement of Graham T. Allison). Swe-
den contracted to develop a computerized air traffic control system after IBM's Ii-
cense application was denied.
83. D. DEwEY, MONOPOLY AND ECONOMICS IN LAW 18 (1959).
84. 1976 Hearings, supra note 57, at 56-57, 178-80 (discussion of the possibility of
cheating in COCOM).
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export controls are not likely to be very effective without greater
and more universal multilateral cooperation. The tendency of
countries to cheat would probably be minimized by concentrating
on truly revolutionary technology of military significance as a na-
tion's self survival is more clearly threatened by the export of such
technology. This approach is also called for by purely domestic
considerations.
If the export control system is to be effective, a number of large
gaps will have to be closed. The control effort should concentrate
on the revolutionary technology of military significance rather
than insignificant items. It is imperative that greater multilateral
cooperation be obtained. This approach requires a lengthier re-
view process, which is warranted by the high level of technology
being reviewed. Yet, even if these steps were taken, there is no
assurance that the control system will even be moderately effec-
tive since there will always be a large number of methods by
which a resourceful adversary can obtain technology. It does not
appear to be feasible to significantly reduce internal disclosure
without unduly impeding technical progress and endangering the
openness of our society.
D. Independent Development
The export controls of the EAA apply to technology and goods
but not to scientific knowledge. The definition of technology is
limited by the EAA to "information and know-how that can be
used to design, produce ... goods."' 85 Scientific knowledge refers
to "knowledge of the physical world and its phenomena."
86 Sci-
entific knowledge is also not included on the munitions list.
7
While scientific knowledge is not subsumed in the EAA definition
of technology because it cannot be used to design or produce
goods,88 it remains the base upon which technology is developed.
The absence of export controls on scientific knowledge and the
universal proclivity of scientists to publicize the results of their
research has led to wide dissemination of new scientific knowl-
edge. The proliferation of scientific journals and seminars has
provided numerous public forums for the presentation of the
smallest advances in knowledge. In addition, the best technical
85. 50 U.S.C. § 2415(4) (Supp. III 1979).
86. 1976 Hearings, supra note 57, at 213 (1976) (statement of J. Fred Bucy).
87. Technical data relating to articles on the munitions list is included on the list.
22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (Category XVIII) (1984). Technical data is defined to mean infor-
mation that can be used in the manufacture of items on the munitions list. Id. at
§ 125.01. As scientific knowledge cannot normally be so used, it would seem to be
excluded by implication.
88. 50 U.S.C. § 2415(4) (Supp. III 1979).
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universities (especially in the United States) frequently admit for-
eign students89 who are exposed to the latest scientific advances,
which they take back to their home countries. There are many
visits and exchanges between scientists of different countries for
the purpose of exchanging discoveries and ideas, etc.
While scientific knowledge has no immediate military applica-
tion, it is often the basis of new military technology. 90 Due to the
wide dissemination of information, the United States and the So-
viet Union frequently commence development with essentially the
same scientific base. It is also important to bear in mind that ad-
vances are increasingly being made abroad by our allies and po-
tential adversaries alike. The Soviets have become very proficient
in making advances in certain fields of scientific knowledge.91
The increased success in science by a potential adversary strength-
ens its technological infrastructure, by facilitating the develop-
ment of new military technology.
Thus, it is not surprising that the United States and the Soviet
Union frequently develop similar technology at about the same
point in time.92 This same phenomenon frequently occurs in the
development of civilian technology where two or more firms con-
temporaneously develop the same new technology.93 In fact, pat-
ent interference proceedings are frequently necessary to determine
who developed an important technology first.94 The contempora-
neous development of civilian and military technology is seldom,
if ever, merely a random event. Rather, it is due to the scientific
base reaching the level necessary for development.
Export controls are not applied to scientific knowledge largely
because it does not have any immediate military application. Im-
plicit in the lack of control over scientific knowledge is the recog-
nition that early dissemination of knowledge is essential for
89. There are approximately 235,000 foreign students studying in colleges and
universities in the United States in 1978. MARQUIS, ACADEMIC MEDIA OF YEARBOOK
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 645 (12th ed. 1980-81).
90. For example, microprocessors were rapidly adapted to military use.
91. Transfer of Technology to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations ofthe Senate Comm. on Governmen-
talAffairs 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (statement of J. Fred Bucy).
92. See supra note 12 for examples.
93. For example, the antibiotic, tetracycline, was discovered at about the same
time by researchers at American Cyanamid Co., Bristol Laboratories, Inc., Heyden
Chemical Corporation and Chas. Pfizer & Co., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Eco-
NOMICS REPORT ON ANTIBIOTICS MANUFACTURE 232 (1958). See BOTrCHER, WON-
DER DRUGs-A HISTORY OF ANTIBIOTICS 188-90 (1964).
94. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1976). Under the United States patent system, a patent is
awarded to the first inventor. An interference procedure has been established to de-
termine priority between two or more persons who claim the same patentable inven-
tion. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-1.286 (1983). See Marquis, 4 Multiple Patent Proposal, 14
IDEA 145 (1970).
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scientific progress, a goal that Congress obviously thought out-
weighed any military advantage that might be lost by early dis-
semination of scientific knowledge. The absence of controls
creates an inherent weakness in the system. However, an attempt
to impose any greater governmental controls on the dissemination
of scientific knowledge would undoubtedly result in an uproar in
the scientific community. It might be difficult to effectively ad-minister such controls without severely restricting the freedom of
inquiry enjoyed by researchers.
Nevertheless, the early and wide dissemination of new scientific
knowledge may tend to result in the two potential adversaries con-
temporaneously developing military applications based upon the
scientific knowledge. Of course, in some cases the military tech-
nology is based upon relatively old scientific knowledge. Because
of the wide dissemination of scientific knowledge and the controls
on technology export, any gap between the two potential adversa-
ries is likely to be in technology and not in scientific knowledge.95
III. REsOURCE FREEING THEORY
Diametrically opposed to the concept of controlling only the ex-
port of militarily critical technology is the resource-freeing the-
ory.96 Under this theory any technology transferred to a potential
adversary frees some of its technological resources from the con-
sumer sector for use in the military sector. For example, the sale
of wheat to the Soviet Union arguably frees some of their agricul-
tural resources and personnel for utilization in other areas so that
the freed resources can be filtered through to enhance their mili-
tary capability. Taken to its logical conclusion, all trade with a
potential adversary would be stopped. Adoption of this theory
would not be very compatible with the pursuit of detente. The
United States would also forfeit the advantages it has been receiv-
ing from such trade, for example, disposing of surplus agricultural
crops for money needed to buy imported oil. It would also seem
that the further removed the traded goods are from the military
field, the greater the inefficiency in ultimately freeing resources
for use in enhancing military capability. This approach would
also undoubtedly force the Soviet Union to become more self-suf-
ficient in all areas. The decreased interdependence on the United
States might be destabilizing and lead to reckless political or mili-
tary action. The resource-freeing theory does not have much to
commend it for adoption by the United States at the present time.
95. D. SPENCER, supra note 50, at 17.
96. Note, U.S. Technology Transfers to Soviet Union and the Protection of Na-
tional Security, LAW & PoL'Y. INT'L Bus. 1137, 1156 (1979).
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It does not seem to be applied in war time, but even then there
may be mutual advantages for trading with the enemy.97
IV. ADVANTAGES OF TRADE
The underlying assumption made by the United States in re-
stricting the flow of militarily significant goods and technology to
the Soviet Union is that the United States cannot benefit from
trade that involves such exports. This assumption is contrary to
the well accepted conclusion that trade in goods between two
countries is to their mutual advantage if certain conditions are
met.98 These conditions are:
(1) Each country differs from the other in the marginal valua-
tion of two or more goods;
(2) Each country exports goods it values less than the goods it
acquires;(3) The terms of trade lie within the limits of the respective
marginal valuations of the two countries.99
In other words, each country sacrifices the item exported, but each
places a higher value on the imported item.
It is commonly thought that the above analysis does not apply
to trade in militarily significant goods (hereinafter called "military
arms") 1°° because of national security considerations. It is more
accurate to state that the above analysis is equally applicable to
military arms, but that unlike most other goods, a national value
is placed upon denying military arms to a potential adversary for
national security reasons. Arms exported to a potential adversary
may significantly enhance its military capability. No country rel-
ishes the thought that exported arms might be used against it in an
armed conflict. There is a danger that too much emphasis may be
placed on this point when comparable arms are available from
other sources. Trade in military arms is also different from other
goods in that a high national value is often placed upon making
military arms available to allies for mutual defense or offense.
The values of denying arms to potential adversaries and making
arms available to allies results in the commonly observed phe-
nomenon of greater arms trade among allies than potential adver-
saries even when armed conflict is not imminent. Acceptance of
97. SeeJ. HELLER, CATCH 22 411 (1961).
98. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 723 (3d ed. 1972) [here-
inafter cited as UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS].
99. Id
100. While military arms are only one class of militarily significant goods, it is
believed that the trade analysis is applicable to all classes of militarily significant
goods. Some goods, such as computer technology, may enhance military capacity
more than certain types of arms.
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these values by the United States translates in economic terms to
money lost by foregoing arms sales to potential adversaries and
lowering arms prices to induce allies to buy arms rather than non-
military goods. These lost dollars mean fewer imported goods for
the United States.
The analysis of arms trade has so far proceeded on the assump-
tion that only private goods are traded. Private goods are those
whose utility to a person is dependent upon the quantity he has
and "the more he has of that good, the less someone else must
have."' 01 A military tank is a private good in that a tank being
used by the United States Army cannot be used at the same time
by the Soviet Army. Technology is not a private good in that the
amount used by one person does not reduce the amount that can
be used by someone else.' 02 Economists call such goods "public
goods." 0 3 Not only is technology a public good, but arms incor-
porating technology that can be learned from inspection also have
attributes of public goods.
The above analysis of trade in private goods must be modified
in several respects when applied to trade in arms technology, a
public good. It would seem that arms technology could be used
simultaneously by all countries without diminishing its'use by the
originating country or any other country. Consequently, the
originating country need not give up use of the technology ex-
ported. If all of the costs for producing the technology are allo-
cated to arms produced in the originating country, there are
obviously no production costs on exported technology. Unlike
private goods, the costs of export, e.g., transportation, l1 n are mini-
mal for technology.
An added advantage of exporting technology is that the antici-
pated profits provide an additional incentive to produce technol-
ogy.' 05 This benefits the exporting country as it has more
technology to trade. Less is lost by exporting technology if new
technology is constantly being developed, as delays in transfer
preserve a continuous lead time for the exporting country. It is
frequently assumed that it is impossible to produce too much tech-
nology, but fewer goods and services are produced at the expense
of expanded technology production. This must be balanced
against the extent to which the technology reduces the cost of pro-
ducing goods and services. We assume, without really knowing,
101. UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS, supra note 98, at 147.
102. L. YEAGER & D. TUERCK, FOREIGN TRADE & U.S. POLICY 15 (1976).
103. UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS, supra note 98, at 147.
104. C. KINDLEBERGER, FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 9
(1962).
105. UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS, supra note 98, at 246.
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that the cost of the technology production is usually less than the
cost reduction in goods and services production to which the tech-
nology relates.
While these considerations largely weigh in favor of a country
freely trading its arms technology, there are several other trade
considerations that must be taken into account. Export of tech-
nology is similar to export of capital goods in one respect; both
may be used to produce goods for domestic use or export which
may adversely affect exports of such goods from the country in
which the technology or capital goods originated. This will only
occur where the country importing the technology or capital
goods has a comparative cost advantage over the originating
country in producing and transporting the goods. The originating
country can price the technology to remove the anticipated com-
parative cost advantage on exports that would otherwise be en-
joyed by the importing country.
The technology exported may lead to the development of addi-
tional technology in the importing country which may give it a
trade advantage, especially if the additional technology is not de-
veloped in the exporting country. The fear of this happening may
be a significant factor deterring technology exports.
In spite of these negative factors, it is contended that the pro
trade factors dictate that trade in arms technology should not be
arbitrarily foreclosed. Proper analysis requires balancing the na-
tional gains and losses from transferring technology against the
value of what is recieved in return. This approach would not in-
evitably lead to increased exports of arms technology, but it is
contended that the analysis provides a better framework for deci-
sionmaking. This approach also takes into account that arms
technology is a public good and the ramifications of exporting this
type of public good.
The transaction costs of exporting arms technology under the
present procedure appear to be significant. The complexity of the
procedure for obtaining an export license necessitates that an arms
exporter master expensive expertise to obtain a license. The de-
lays frequently encountered in securing a license add to the trans-
action costs. The greater the transaction costs, the greater the
deviation from the optimum amount of trade. One might think
that transaction costs would have little impact on trade since the
other costs of exporting technology are minimal. However, the
transaction costs reduce the exporter's profits which he must
weigh against anticipated losses from diffusion of the technology.
Consequently, he will either increase the price of the technology
by the amount of the transaction costs or possibly forego the trade,
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resulting in less overall trade. While transaction costs could be
reduced by simplifying the licensing process and concentrating the
regulatory effort on controlling revolutionary technology, these
transaction costs cannot be removed without abandoning govern-
ment regulation.
The major difference between exporting arms technology and
other types of public goods is that a national security value must
be inserted into the trade equation for arms. Not inserting this
value could drastically alter the relative military strength of the
two countries. Inserting this value necessarily means that the
terms and conditions of the trade must be set or regulated by the
government and not be a private party. While a private party
conceivably may take the security of his nation into account, his
personal loss in security by one sale is infinitesimally less than
total loss of all individuals in the nation. The trading individual's
loss in security is nearly certain to be overbalanced by his private
gain from the trade. This is not to suggest that the trading indi-
vidual will only evaluate the trade in economic terms. Other val-
ues, such as national loyalty, may influence the decision of some
individuals. However, the determination of whether arms export
is beneficial to the United States should be made by the govern-
ment who can assess the national security value on behalf of the
entire nation.
In advocating government assessment of security value, it is not
suggested that the government should force the export of arms
owned by a private party when the government concludes that the
trade would be beneficial to the United States. It is conceivable
that the trade would not be perceived by a private party as being
beneficial to him. There does not seem to be any compelling rea-
son to alter the rule applicable to other goods that the owner of
the goods must initiate the trade. The government only serves to
block a trade which is not in the best interest of the United States
for some reason.
In order to have a basis for trade, both countries must be will-
ing. At present, the United States is not willing to trade arms with
the Soviet Union. In the 1930's the Soviet Union pursued a goal
of self-sufficiency in economic and technical development and
was uninterested in trade. 10 6 The Soviet Union now appears to
recognize certain weaknesses in its technology and is more inter-
ested in trading with the West.'0 7
It might be argued that the Soviet Union would not be inter-
106. G. HOLLIDAY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE U.S.S.R. 1928-1937 and
1966-1975. The Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development.
107. Id.
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ested in trading for military arms of the United States if the au-
thor's conclusion is correct that the Soviet Union is likely to
obtain the technology regardless of the controls. However, the So-
viet Union incurs transaction costs, which may be significant, in
obtaining the technology. Of course, there is no assurance of suc-
cess and any delay in obtaining the technology helps maintain a
headstart advantage for the United States.
The Soviet Union would not be interested in a trade if they con-
cluded that their transaction costs, plus the anticipated costs of
delay, would be less than the cost of the trade (i.e., value of their
export traded). Entering into trade negotiations should shed con-
siderable light upon the Soviet Union's perception of its success in
quickly obtaining Western technology.
Because the private party may only be willing to sell the arms
for money, the government may decide in some cases that the
value of injecting the money into the domestic economy is more
than offset by the loss in national security. In such cases, it might
be desirable for the government to buy the technology from the
private party and trade with the Soviet Union for arms or other
goods the government deems of greater value to it, which would
be licensed or sold to private firms or utilized by the government.
An argument can be made that any trade should be limited to
the barter of arms. It may be easier for each country to evaluate
the national security ramifications of a barter of arms than a cash
sale. A barter between three countries may be feasible in some
situations. Suppose that Country A has developed a new tank for
which Country B is willing to trade a certain quantity of wheat.
While the wheat has no direct military significance, Country A
might be able to trade the wheat with Country C for arms. The
three party trade would be beneficial to Country A from a military
standpoint if the arms it received from Country Cwere more valu-
able to it than the arms sold to Country B. Indeed, trade should
not be arbitrarily limited to barter as Country B could pay Coun-
try A who could then buy the technology from Country C.
It can be argued that trade should not be limited to barter, as a
value can always be placed upon national security. If the price
received is high enough, it may strengthen the overall domestic
economy more than enough to compensate for any loss in national
security.
At least a balancing of the gain and loss from trade is attempted
under this approach. Under the present approach, governmental
review is limited to the question of military significance to the So-
viet Union without considering any gain to the United States.
The gain and loss from trade should be considered from both the
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long and short term standpoint. For example, high technology
might not have any impact upon short term military significance
but may have immense military significance in the future. Con-
versely, state-of-the-art arms may enhance short term military ca-
pability but have little long term significance. Balancing short
term and long term gains and losses involves assessing the pros-
pect of conflict at various points of time. Of course, arms have a
deterrence value which may be as important as their value in war.
Under the approach suggested, arms export should not be
viewed in a strict control sense but rather from a trade standpoint
which also considers national security values. Consequently, a
central governmental "licensing agency" should be more appro-
priate than an "export control agency." As in the present situa-
tion, mutilateral cooperation is essential to achieving these
objectives. Ideally, a multilateral licensing agency could be estab-
lished to handle the licensing.
CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that the present export controls are very effec-
tive in preventing militarily significant data from being obtained
by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union appears to be very deter-
mined and resourceful, and there are many repositories for much
of the technical data they desire. Because much of the data is
probably obtained surreptitiously, it is difficult to empirically ver-
ify their success. There are two ways in which to deal with this
problem.
More pervasive controls could be imposed upon export of tech-
nology, especially revolutionary technology. It would also be nec-
essary to impose controls on dissemination within the United
States. In addition, controls on the domestic dissemination of sci-
entific knowledge would need to be imposed. The imposition of
pervasive controls by the United States would not work without
multilateral cooperation by all of the non-Communist countries
that possess the technology desired by the Soviet Union. While it
might be possible to secure the greater cooperation of the allies of
the United States, it seems unlikely that the non-aligned countries
would cooperate. The most serious objections to imposing more
pervasive controls are that it is inconsistent with principles of a
democratic society and controlling the dissemination of data im-
pedes scientific research. It would also interfere with the educa-
tion mission of the science departments of universities.
The author proposes that militarily significant technology
should be made available for trade. The emphasis should not be
on denying access to the Soviet Union, but rather whether the
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United States receives imported goods or technology that it values
more than what it exported. It is believed that multilateral coop-
eration may be easier to achieve with a limited trading mechanism
than with the present embargo approach. There might not be
much more trading under the proposed approach than under the
present system, but it facilitates a more objective evaluation of the
costs and gains to the United States of a proposed trade.
It is conceivable that a trading approach would tend to main-
tain a parity in militarily significant technology between the
United States and the Soviet Union. For example, if the Soviet
Union were behind in a critical area, they would likely be willing
to pay a high price for the technology. While it is common to
think that the United States is more secure if it has a superior
military advantage, there may in fact be a greater chance of con-
flict if one adversary has a significant edge.
The degree of effectiveness of the controls may be directly re-
lated to the probability of war between the two potential adversa-
ries. If one country is able to make important technological
developments and maintain an exclusive position, it may seek to
exploit its advantage. Fear that it may do so may provoke pre-
emptive action by the less powerful adversary before it is too late
to have a prospect of success. Thus, the export controls may have
a destabilizing influence.
From the standpoint of military power, the world appears to be
bipolar in that a bloc will fight a major war rather than permitting
the rival bloc from obtaining preponderant strength.10 8 A bloc
that thought the other bloc was in the process of obtaining pre-
ponderant strength might be tempted to launch a preemptive
strike. It would be less tempting to do so if the deprived bloc
could obtain the technology, even at a monopoly price. The fact
that we have not had a major war since World War II may be
some indication of the stability of a bipolar world. If that is true,
steps should be taken to preserve it. It is believed that increased
trade in militarily significant data may have a preservation effect.
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